This text examines the similarities between Switzerland and the Principality of Liechtenstein regarding leniency programs in competition law.
Liechtenstein and Switzerland maintain a close and dynamic partnership that includes numerous national and international regulations, EU and EEA/EFTA provisions, as well as various bilateral agreements. In 1995, Liechtenstein joined the European Economic Area (EEA), significantly impacting the country’s economic growth and competitiveness. One example is the gas supply market, where real competition emerged even in a small market. The Liechtenstein Gas Supply (LGV) was able to pass on a price reduction of approximately 40% to its end customers by securing lower purchase prices on trading markets and optimizing its procurement and distribution system—all without facing competitive pressure from other market participants.
In cartel cases, members who cooperate can be rewarded with reduced penalties, and whistleblowers may even be granted full immunity. In recent years, leniency programs in Switzerland and Liechtenstein have become increasingly aligned, leading to greater legal certainty due to growing international integration and competition regulation. The congruence rule, based on the “first-come, first-served” principle, plays a decisive role in this process.
In Switzerland, agreements between companies at the same market level that restrict competition without economically justified reasons are prohibited. Companies that voluntarily disclose their involvement in anti-competitive agreements and provide information enabling the Competition Commission (WEKO) to open an investigation may be granted immunity. The extent of the provided information is important, but its substantive significance is even more crucial. To qualify for immunity, WEKO requires continuous and full cooperation from the company, including the voluntary submission of all relevant evidence, as well as the cessation of participation in the anti-competitive behavior no later than the time of self-reporting or upon WEKO’s order.
However, if a company was coerced into participating in a cartel, it does not receive full immunity. Switzerland goes beyond EU regulations in this regard, excluding companies that played an instigating or leading role in anti-competitive conduct from benefiting from the leniency program. Unlike in the EU, Switzerland’s bonus program applies not only to horizontal cartels but also to vertical agreements and the abuse of market dominance.
